Kosovo - 2 Essays

Kosovo: A Self-inflicted  U.S. Policy Dilemma

During a recent telephone interview with Don Imus on the Imus on MSNBC show, CBS news icon, Dan Rather, stated that the United States is supporting Kosovo's ethnic Albanians "because they are the underdog".  This gross over simplification of an extremely complex and dangerously explosive situation is illustrative of the United States' shortsighted and naïve Kosovo policy.

United States intervention in the conflict between ethnic Albanians and Serbian nationalists in Kosovo is a self-inflicted policy dilemma that is fraught with danger for the United States, as well as the Balkans.  It is a policy dilemma because the Clinton Administration has naively positioned the United States between two irreconcilable principles --- the principle of self-determination and the principle of sovereignty.

For the ethnic Albanians, their struggle is guided by the principle
of self-determination, which was espoused by post World War I
liberal-idealists and legitimized by the Charter of the United Nations. 

The principle of self-determination seeks to make national borders conform to ethnonational groupings.  It asserts that ethnonational groups have the right to determine what political authority will represent and rule them.  And, it legitimizes the struggle of ethnonational movements to realize an independent state and self-rule through the fragmentation of the territorial integrity of an existing state.     

For the Serbian nationalists, their struggle is rooted in the principle of sovereignty, which has served as the cornerstone for international law since the Treaty of Westphalia that ended Europe's Thirty Years' War in 1648.

The principle of sovereignty establishes that no authority is above the state.  It confers upon each state of the world the right of territorial inviolability, the right to establish whatever form of government it thinks best and the right to rule its population.  And, it empowers the state with the freedom--and responsibility--to do whatever is necessary to protect its survival and interests.

   Given these two irreconcilable principles, the struggle between the ethnic Albanians and Serb nationalists is as dangerously explosive as a minefield.  The struggle for each is based in principle.  The struggle for each is righteous.  The struggle for each is worth fighting and dying for.

  Intrusion into this minefield by the United States was an extremely precarious undertaking, to say the least.  Consequently, the United States' Kosovo policy should have proceeded cautiously in a balanced and reasoned manner. 

To the contrary, the United States' Kosovo policy has exhibited the situational awareness and rational thinking of a child playing with a live hand grenade!  Instead of being balanced and reasoned, the United States' Kosovo policy has been one-sided and heavy-handed.  As a result, the United States finds itself in a self-inflicted policy dilemma fraught with danger. 

The one-sidedness of the United States' Kosovo policy has clearly favored the ethnic Albanians' struggle guided by the principle of self-determination.

   This has only served to raise their expectations, making a compromise settlement far less likely.  This has been made clear by the reluctance of Kosovo's ethnic Albanians to accept a settlement brokered by the United States that calls for Kosovo's autonomy within Serbia for three years followed by independence.  Their reluctance to embrace this favorable settlement is an indication that their expectations may be far higher.

The raised expectations of  Kosovo's ethnic Albanians are a potentially explosive danger for the Balkans and the United States.   The ethnonational forces that seek to detach Kosovo from Serbia could embolden the ethnic dismemberment of neighboring Macedonia and the incorporation of anarchy-ridden Albania.  Also, the flames of self-determination, once ignited in the Balkans, could spark separatist revolts in the 120 states of the world that have politically significant ethnic minorities. 

On the other hand, the raised expectations of Kosovo's ethnic Albanians, if not realized, could result in ethnonational groups and sympathetic governments wreaking their disappointments and frustrations against American interests and citizens.

Conversely, the United States' heavy-handed Kosovo policy has blithely disregarded the Serbian nationalists' struggle rooted in the principle of sovereignty.   

The heavy-handed approach of the United States has overlooked the legality that Kosovo is an integral part of a sovereign state.  It has denied the reality that Kosovo is the historical, cultural and religious heart of  Serbia.  And, it has ignored the fact that Kosovo has the emotional attachment for the Serbians that the Alamo has for Americans.

This heavy-handed approach has fortified the resolve of the Serbian nationalists fueling a potentially explosive danger for the Balkans and the United States.  In this regard, history warns that the depth of Serbian resolve cannot be discounted or underestimated.

The Serbian nationalists resisted the Ottoman Empire's occupation for over 500 years.  They opposed an agreement between Hitler and their government by fighting 16 German divisions to a stalemate under the rallying cry, "better the grave than a slave".  They defied Stalin's political and economic isolation, as well as his coercive threats, to preserve Yugoslav sovereignty.   

Thus, the United States' precarious intervention in Kosovo between two irreconcilable principles has been made extremely explosive by its one-sided, heavy-handed policy. 

By continuing to favor the ethnic Albanians' principle of self-determination, the United States could unwittingly spawn ethnonational threats to the preservation of other  sovereign states.  By continuing to deny the Serbian nationalists' principle of sovereignty, the United States could willfully fan the fires of military conflict by backing a sovereign state and its proud people into a corner.

Not surprisingly, therefore, the United States finds its Kosovo policy in the self-inflicted dilemma of being trapped between the proverbial "rock and a hard place". 

         Kosovo and America's National Interest

When a sovereign state resorts to the use of military force against another sovereign state, this constitutes an act of war.  Today, as I write this column, the United States has engaged in an act of war against Yugoslavia.     

President Clinton, as well as both Democrat and Republican supporters of this act of war, have justified the resort to military force by arguing hat it is in the national interest of the United States.  The arguments have run the gambit from making the Balkans a safer place to live to preserving NATO's credibility, not as a defensive military alliance, but as a supranational police force. 

Opponents to the use of military force have expressed the concern that even though Yugoslavia is no military match for the United States, an act of war carries with it the danger of unpredictable political, economic and human consequences.

Given the national debate as to whether or not the use of military force in the Balkans is in the national interest of the United States, four fundamental questions beg for answers.

What is the national interest?  What is the goal of the national interest?  When should military force be used in support of the national interest?  Does the use of military force in the Balkans support the national interest of the United States?

The national interest comprises every action that a state takes to support its national aim.  In this regard, a state's national aim is analogous to defending its territorial inviolability, protecting its population from external attack and safeguarding the core values that underlie its people's way of life. 

The goal of the national interest is to maintain or increase a state's power in order to create international conditions favorable to its national aim.  When not muddied by politics, the mobilization and commitment of a state's power should always support, not detract, from the national aim. 

  Since the use of military force carries the greatest costs and unpredictable consequences, it should be an action of last resort for pursuing the national aim.  Consequently, the question of whether or not the use of military force is in the national interest should be measured against a three tier criteria.  This national interest criteria, as defined by political scientists, are survival, vital and secondary interests.

A survival interest is one that poses a direct, serious threat to the physical survival of the state and its population..  The most fundamental, enduring and irreducible responsibility of the state is to defeat or neutralize external threats to its survival.  A survival interest must, therefore, be pursued and protected at all costs.  Accordingly, a state must, without hesitation, mobilize and commit its armed forces to defend a survival interest since its existence is in the balance. 

A vital interest is one that presents a significant threat to the state's ability to protect its core values over time.  The failure of a state to protect its core values can result in the weakening of its political, economic and social institutions to the detriment of its national fabric.  A vital interest should, therefore, be pursued and protected but not necessarily at all costs.  Consequently, a state should mobilize and commit its armed forces to protect a vital interest because the state's national aim could be at risk. 

A secondary interest is one that is peripheral and transitory to a state's survivability and core values.  As such, it has no impact on a state's survival and little, if any, impact on its core values.  A secondary interest should, as a rule, not be  pursued and protected.  Thus, a state should never mobilize and commit its armed forces to protect a secondary interest because its value to the national aim is limited to none. 

Given the national interest's goal and its criteria for the commitment of armed forces, the answer to the question as to whether the use of military force in the Balkans is in the national interest of the United States, is a resounding "no" for several reasons.

First, and most importantly, the situation in Kosovo is clearly a secondary interest. The struggle between the ethnic Albanians and Serbian nationalists in Kosovo threatens neither the survivability nor core values of the United States.  Humanitarian concerns, NATO credibility, moral indignation and failed diplomacy are not reasons for putting young American men and women of our armed forces in harm's way. 

As an infantry soldier who witnessed death and destruction on the battlefields of Vietnam, there is no greater fear or futility than dying for nothing.

Secondly, the use of military force by the United States against Yugoslavia directs American attention and diverts its limited military resources away from the United States' national aim of "preserving the American way of life".  By divesting its political capital, military power and overburdened treasury for a secondary interest in the Balkans, the United States only misdirects its efforts and resources away from far more serious threats that jeopardize our national security. 

The United States, portraying the defense of South Vietnam as a vital   U.S. interest, lost almost 60,000 American lives and expended tens of  billions of dollars.  The fact that the fall of South Vietnam had no impact what-so-ever on America's national aim proved that it was a secondary interest.  Thus, at the height of the Cold War struggle with the Soviet Union, America's armed forces were weakened and demoralized for the sake of a secondary interest. 

Lastly, the resort to military force on behalf of a secondary interest in Kosovo carries with it the potential for unpredictable consequences that could put America's national aim in danger.  We cannot discard Russia's historic fears of national insecurity.  Coupled with the expansion of NATO into Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, the use of military force by America and its NATO allies against Yugoslavia has the very real potential for resurrecting Russian fears of national insecurity. 

Kosovo has now been added to a list of secondary interests where the United States has resorted to the use of its armed forces --- Korea, Vietnam, Lebanon, Somolia, Haiti and Bosnia.  To preclude this list from growing further to the detriment of the United States' national aim, we should be mindful of  the words of counsel expressed by Senator Phil Gramm (R-TX) several years ago, "Foreign policy is not social work".