NATO's War - 2 Essays

As NATO bombs rain on Yugoslavia for the eighth consecutive week, two  indelible lessons are engraved on the Balkan landscape for future American leaders to ponder.  These lessons are not new lessons.  They are old lessons gleaned from past wars. Sadly, however, these old lessons were discarded as being irrelevant by NATO decision-makers.  As a consequence, we find ourselves in a spiral of faulty reasoning and repeated mistakes. 

The most fundamental lesson of NATO's war is that our nation's armed forces should only be committed to safeguard a vital national interest of the United States.  A  national interest is vital if it has direct impact on America's ability to preserve the American way of life. 

Consequently, a compelling question must be asked during the decision-making process to commit our armed forces to hostile action.  Does the risk to our young servicemen and servicewomen and the expenditure of scarce resources contribute directly to preserving the American way of life?

Failure to address this quintessential question in the case of Kosovo has witnessed  the commitment of America's armed forces to battle.  NATO's war against Yugoslavia, though noble in its humanitarian motive, has no direct impact on the American way of life.  The war to protect the Kosovars is transitory and peripheral to the American way of life.  As such, it is not a vital national interest.

This has produced two very dangerous outcomes.  First, the U.S. has misdirected  its national security focus to a secondary interest at the expense of vital interests.  In particular, NATO's war has seriously placed our relationships with two of the world's nuclear powers---Russia and China---in jeopardy.  Russia's historical distrust and fear of the West  has been rekindled by NATO's air war against its Slavic brothers.  China's xenophobic hostility has been elevated by the missile attack on its Belgrade embassy. 

Secondly, the U.S. has divested its military might for a secondary interest at the expense of vital interests.  The strains of NATO's war on America's overextended, overcommited and under resourced armed forces have been bared for all the world to see. 

As the bombing intensifies, U.S. munitions stocks are being dangerously depleted.  The supply of Air Force and Navy cruise missiles has become precariously low.  The Air Force's supply of precision munitions is approaching exhaustion.  And, the Pacific Ocean has been left without a single aircraft carrier. 

The further weakening of our armed forces by NATO's war has significantly increased the gap between our national security strategy and our armed forces' ability to execute it.   This gap is dangerous in itself .  It greatly increases America's vulnerability.  It places our vital interests at risk.  And, it invites our enemies to test us.

  Our national leaders should be investing our military might for the real threats to America and not divesting it for perceived threats in the Balkans.. 

The second lesson is that former Secretary of Defense Weinberger's doctrine for committing America's armed forces to battle, which our political leaders wisely followed and our military leaders artfully orchestrated during the Persian Gulf War, is a proven strategy for assuring decisive victory at minimal costs. 

Although the "Weinberger Doctrine" is firmly rooted in the principles of war and battle-tested, NATO's decision-makers have inexplicably disregarded its three tenets. As a result, there is no clearly defined objective.  There is no overwhelming force.  There is no exit strategy. 

In discarding the "Weinberger Doctrine", NATO has violated two especially important   principles of war---objective and mass---in favor of political ambiguity and temerity.  The principle of objective relentlessly directs all military operations toward one end---the destruction of the enemy's armed forces and their will to win.  The principle of mass requires that all military means be brought to bear in order to concentrate overwhelming combat power at the decisive place and time. 

Instead, NATO has limited the war to one dimension---the air.  It has further compounded this self-imposed limitation by prosecuting the air war in an incremental manner reminiscent of the gradualism that doomed America to defeat in Viet Nam.

NATO's failure to have an exit strategy can be attributed to not knowing the enemy and do not understanding the nature of the conflict due to an obvious denial of history's lessons.  The Serbs are fervent nationalists who have fiercely defended their homeland.  They gallantly fought Hitler's divisions to a stalemate.   They boldly resisted the intimidating shadow of Stalin's armies to be free of Soviet hegemony. 

The nature of the conflict is misunderstood because NATO refused to accept the historical fact that air power alone has never defeated an enemy.  To be victorious, war must be multi-dimensional with each dimension mutually supporting.  Hitler learned this lesson in the Battle of Britain when his daily blitzkrieg only served to fortify Britain's resistance.  The U.S. learned this lesson in Viet Nam when it dropped twice the World War II tonnage of bombs to only stiffen North Vietnamese resolve.

These lessons of past wars are now engraved on the Balkan landscape.  Will old men ever heed these lessons so that young men can grow old?


                 What Price Victory?

After 78 days of a NATO air war waged against Yugoslavia on behalf of humanitarian interests, President Clinton reported to the nation, "We have achieved a victory for a safer world, for our democratic values and for a stronger America".  Since his euphoric report to the nation several weeks ago, the passage of time raises the question, "What price victory?"

In answering this question, the price of victory needs to be assessed within the framework of a costs-benefits analysis.  Accordingly, the tangible and intangible costs of NATO's Balkan victory should be weighed against the purported benefits proclaimed by President Clinton.

Contrary to the perception created by media and political spinmeisters, NATO's victory has made neither the Balkans nor the world a safer place. 

The victory has intensified past hatreds and has given birth to a new cycle of retribution.  The wide scale destruction and systematic ethnic cleansing ignited by NATO bombs have economically devastated the region.  Withdrawal of Serbian authority coupled with the rising assertiveness of the KLA have made Kosovo a flash point for renewed hostilities.  The mass exodus and return of over a million ethnic Albanian refugees followed by the flight of thousands of Serbs are fodder for continued political instability. 

NATO's military intervention in Kosovo has also made future world stability more precarious than ever by its disregard for the principle of sovereignty that has sustained international order for over 350 years. 

NATO's violation of Yugoslavia's sovereignty on Russia's doorstep has elevated Russian fear and distrust of the West to former Cold War levels making direct confrontation and conflict a potentiality.  The inadvertent U.S. missile attack on China's Belgrade embassy has inflamed Chinese xenophobia which promises to end the U.S.-China marriage of convenience in a bitter and, quite possibly, hostile divorce.  Lastly, contrary to NATO's facade, the price of victory has weakened its credibility and unity.

Has the price of victory made the world safer?  I think not.

The cornerstone of America's democratic values is popular consent.  This value holds that a just government derives its power and authority from the consent of the people.  The framers of the Constitution, therefore, sought to safeguard popular consent by guarding against the concentration of power in any one person or branch of government.  Accordingly, the framers crafted a government characterized by separation of powers and a system of checks and balances.

Recognizing that military power is the quintessential element of government's power and that "the Executive is the branch of government most interested in war, and most prone to it", the framers took particular care to wisely divide the national government's war-making powers between the executive and legislative branches. 

Since World War II, however, the challenges of America's world leadership role and the exigencies of modern warfare have witnessed the relentless trend of a Congress reluctant to check and balance presidential war-making power.

As a consequence, a feckless Congress has unwisely allowed President Clinton to expand presidential war-making power with his "cruise missile diplomacy".  This unchallenged expansion of presidential war-making power is fueling an ever increasing concentration of political power in the executive branch. 

An imbalance of power between the branches of government is inherently dangerous.  It emboldens an arrogance of power that disregards and, thereby, endangers the democratic value of popular consent.  As proven by our Viet Nam experience, the concentration of power in the executive branch limits perspective, stifles dialogue and nurtures blind obedience.   

Has the price of victory strengthen our democratic values?  I think not.

Rather than strengthening America, the victory in Kosovo is further divesting America's military power and economic resources. 

The Administration's  "cruise missile diplomacy" has stretched the U.S. military to the breaking point.  While being systematically cut in half since 1989, its peace-keeping and peace enforcement missions have increased operational tempo a debilitating 300 percent.  This is literally wearing out personnel and equipment, as well as depleting munitions and spare parts.  The indefinite deployment of 7,000 U.S. troops to Kosovo  will only add to the degradation of the warrior spirit and fighting capability of America's armed forces.

The victory in Kosovo is a real economic booby prize.  The rebuilding of Kosovo and ultimately all of Yugoslavia will have enormous economic costs.  The rebuilding of Kosovo is placed conservatively at $30 billion.   Estimates for the rebuilding of Serbia are as high as $60 billion. 

Regardless of the accuracy of these estimates, three things are certain. 

First, the rebuilding of Kosovo and Serbia will be as great and as costly an undertaking as the Marshal Plan that economically revitalized Western Europe. 

Secondly, the U.S. will, as always, shoulder the heaviest burden for the rebuilding costs.  Despite the U.S. paying the bulk of the $4 billion plus costs of NATO's air war, Europeans are already demanding that Americans pay half of the rebuilding costs, not the 10 cents on the dollar proposed by the U.S.  . 

Third, in spite of the current budget surplus and the Administration's rosy prediction of a $5.9 trillion surplus over the next 15 years, our economic resources have limits, as well as critically important domestic priorities.  America's $ 5.5 trillion national debt, urgent infrastructure needs, pressing social challenges and the rebuilding of our military must be addressed and resolved if we are to remain a strong and great nation.

Has the price of victory in Kosovo made America stronger?  I think not.

A few more victories like this and....…